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Venture capital (VC) is a form of pri-
vate equity financing for risky young
companies that also have enormous
potential for profit.  Industry boosters
contend that, through the new busi-
nesses it helps launch, venture capi-
tal creates jobs, sparks innovation,
enhances productivity, boosts global
competitiveness and increases tax
revenues.  States and communities
everywhere are clamoring for a stake
in the industry, but venture capital
pools in only a handful of key areas in
the country.  Does Connecticut have
its fair share?
VENTURE CAPITAL UPS AND
DOWNS
In a study released last year, the
National Venture Capital Association
estimated that companies that received
venture capital financing between
1970 and 2003 accounted for 10.1
million jobs and $1.8 trillion in rev-
enue during 2003, or 9.4% of the U.S.
totals.  Many of these companies have
become household names: Microsoft,
Apple, Home Depot, Federal Express,
e-Bay, Starbucks and Google, to name
but a few. 
According to the same report, in
2003 Connecticut ranked 15th
nationally in  jobs at originally ven-
ture-backed companies, with 189.7
thousand posts.  And the Nutmeg
State also ranked 13th that year in
national revenues at venture-backed
companies, with $48.9 billion in pro-
ceeds.
Venture capitalists raise money
from institutional investors such as
pension funds, insurance companies,
endowments, and foundations, and
from wealthy individuals.  The mon-
eies are typically invested in start-up
companies for relatively long periods,
since venture capitalists only realize a
return on investment if the firm goes
public, or is merged with or purchased
by another company.  Investments are
made in stages, with successive allot-
ments dependent on how well the
start-up has met previous performance
benchmarks. 
From the perspective of a compa-
ny’s founder, venture capital carries an
expensive price tag.  Venture capitalists
expect to take a hands-on approach
with their investments, working active-
ly with entrepreneurs to manage the
firm so as to help limit investment risk.
Venture capitalists also reduce their
overall risk by investing in a small, but
diversified, portfolio of young firms.
Just as VC investing rode high on
the technology wave of the late 1990s,
it became one of the many casualties of
the tech wreck of the new millenium.
Venture capitalists invested a total of
$105 billion nationally in 2000 when
the venture capital surge peaked, but
by 2004 that figure had plummeted
80% to just $21.0 billion.  In
Connecticut, VC investment also
eroded.  It totaled $229 million in
Connecticut in 2004, down 8.4%
from 2003, and only 15.5% of the
whopping $1.5 billion invested in
2000.  Today, both nationally and in
Connecticut, VC investment is about
where it was in the late 1990s (see
graph).
Along with the precipitous drop in
VC investment in recent years has
come a shift in its composition.
Nationally, three industries—software,
telecommunications, and networking-
Connecticut Puts its Stock in
High-Risk, High-Return Ventures
Venture capital pools in
only a handful 
of key areas in 
the country.  
Does Connecticut 
have its fair share? FALL 2005  THE CONNECTICUT ECONOMY 5
and-equipment—accounted for 50
percent of venture capital investment
in 2000, giving the VC boom a decid-
edly high-tech, computer-related,
Internet slant.  In 2004, the top three
industries again accounted for half the
total, but biotechnology had replaced
telecommunications as number two,
while networking-and-equipment had
dropped out of the top three. 
In Connecticut, the shift was even
more dramatic.  In 2000, the state’s
top three VC industries—software,
business products and health care serv-
ices—accounted for one third of the
investment dollars.  By 2004, however,
biotechnology alone represented 44%
of total VC investment, and software,
though it had gained share, had
slipped to second place.
EXPLAINING VC INVESTMENT
VC investment has followed essen-
tially the same pattern in all states: ris-
ing briskly in the 1990s, peaking in
2000, and dropping off a cliff since
then.  But in boom or bust, some states
have been consistent leaders in venture
capital investment, while others have
been persistent laggards.  What
accounts for this difference in per-
formance?
Researchers studying variations in
VC investment across countries have
identified a number of explanatory fac-
tors.  Some are tied to the macroeco-
nomic environment, such as the
growth rate of output.  Others are spe-
cific to the market for venture funds,
such as the entrepreneurial environ-
ment and measures of technological
opportunity like spending on R&D.
Many of the same factors that
explain venture capital investment
from country to country also help
explain differences among U.S. states,
according to my cross-sectional regres-
sion analysis of data for the year
2000—at the crest of the VC wave.
Figures from the MoneyTree
Survey for that year show that nation-
ally, VC accounted for an average of
about 0.6% of gross state product
(GSP).  Some states—Wyoming and
South Dakota, for example—had
none, while the national leaders regis-
tered considerably more.  Massachu-
setts, California and Colorado topped
the list at 3.7%, 3.3% and 2.5%,
respectively.  Connecticut posted an
above-average investment rate of
0.9%, placing it 10th among the 50
states and the District of Columbia.
Since interest rates are determined
in national markets, they wouldn’t
affect interstate variations in VC
investment.  But GSP growth does dif-
fer by state, and, after controlling for
other variables, does significantly affect
the interstate variation in venture cap-
ital spending.  At the mean, a ten per-
cent increase in the GSP growth rate
raises the venture capital investment
share by 9.5%.  The reason?  Higher
GSP growth is likely to translate into
more entrepreneurial opportunities
and a greater demand for venture
funding.
Some researchers have also found a
positive connection between self-
employment rates and VC investment,
on the theory that a more entrepre-
neurial workforce is apt to demand
more VC funding.  But venture capital
investors also insist on significant con-
trols over venture firms, which could
discourage entrepreneurial founders
from pursuing VC funding sources.
Perhaps reflecting these countervailing
influences, my estimate showed no sig-
nificant relationship between self-
employment and venture capital
investment.  (See pages 12-13 for more
on self-employment in Connecticut.)
Technological opportunities do
matter, though.  In my model, a ten
percent increase in state R&D spend-
ing boosts VC spending by 3.5%.
Spending on R&D is a logical precur-
sor to VC investment, since the tech-
nological fruits of R&D efforts pro-
duce the market opportunities that VC
investors hope to exploit.  Also, a ten
percent increase in the number of PhD
engineers and scientists yielded a 6.1%
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jump in VC investment.  New ven-
tures, which so often rely on break-
through technologies, just as often
require the involvement of specialized
experts.  It is common, in fact, for
leading academicians to be listed as
team members in the prospectuses of
new ventures going public.
HOW CONNECTICUT STACKS UP
Venture capital investment in
Connecticut may be no match for the
volume of investment generated in
states like Massachusetts, California
and Colorado, but in 2000 it was
above average and higher than expect-
ed, given the factors that seem to influ-
ence investment levels across all states.
GSP growth in Connecticut that year
outpaced the average for all states—
6.6% versus 5.5%—helping to boost
expected VC investment here.  So too
did our above-average commitment to
R&D:  3% of Connecticut GSP, com-
pared with 2% for all states.  
Though Connecticut has a rela-
tively large number of PhDs per capita
(we ranked 8th of 51), in absolute
numbers our total is slightly below
average.   And it is the absolute size of
the PhD population that seems to
matter, perhaps because this commu-
nity is so small to begin with.  
Still, the drag on VC spending
from a relatively small number of sci-
entists and engineers was more than
offset by superior GSP and R&D per-
formance: Connecticut ranked 10th
among states in “venture capital effort”
in 2000, sandwiched between New
Jersey at number 9 and New York at
number 11.  All three states registered
about 0.9% of GSP going to venture
funding.  Massachusetts, whose VC
effort reached 3.8%, led the nation in
venture capital spending as a share of
GSP, helping make New England sec-
ond only to the Silicon Valley as a
regional VC powerhouse.
Since 2000, venture capital invest-
ment has plummeted everywhere, but
it has dropped relatively faster in
Connecticut.  In 2000, Connecticut
venture funding represented 1.4% of
the national total; in 2004 the state
captured only 1.1% of U.S. venture
dollars.  It is not clear whether and
how changes in factors that influence
venture capital effort may account for
the erosion in the state’s VC share.
Timely figures on R&D spending and
PhDs are unavailable, and the 2004
GSP data suggest that Connecticut has
maintained a small (albeit diminished)
margin over other states in output
growth.  Even so, the Nutmeg State’s
ranking on venture capital effort had
slipped just two positions by 2004, to
twelfth in the nation.
STOKING THE FIRES
My simple regression model
underscores the link between R&D,
academic talent, and venture capital
effort.  And since the 1980 Bayh-Dole
Act, which gave universities and other
institutions ownership rights to dis-
coveries funded with federal dollars,
universities have become increasingly
involved in the commercialization of
technology.
At Yale University, the Office of
Cooperative Research (OCR) manages
the university’s intellectual property
and its relationships with private part-
ners.  At the University of Connect-
icut, that job goes to the Office
of Technology Commercialization
(OTC).  OTC manages UConn’s intel-
lectual property through its Center for
Science and Technology Commercial-
ization (CSTC); funds new business
start-ups through its Research and
Development Corporation (UConn
R&D), a for-profit subsidiary of the
UConn Foundation; and outfits start-
ups with lab and office space through
the Technology Incubation Program
(TIP).  (For more on this topic, see
page 24.)
Does university support for new
firms make a difference? Yale’s OCR
boasts the development of 26 private
companies since its inception in 1982.
UConn R&D, a relative latecomer to
technology transfer, has helped launch
seven new companies based on
UConn technology.  But its plans for
the future call for evaluating 10-12
business opportunities annually and
providing management support and
funding for two or three of them.
What makes initiatives like Yale’s
OCR and UConn’s OTC so important
is that they provide the means to capi-
talize on the key determinants of ven-
ture activity: research dollars and tech-
nical expertise.  By offering a formal
setting in which to mix venture
investors together with science and
engineering researchers, University-
housed centers for technology transfer
offer the possibility of making the
most of venture-related resources.
A SIZEABLE SLICE
Venture capital clusters in regions
of the country with an abundance of
R&D and technical expertise and
where economic growth is already
strong.  Given these determinants,
Connecticut may not have the VC
dominance of a Route 128 or Silicon
Valley, but it does have a sizeable slice
of venture capital activity.  That puts
the state in a good position, with the
help of its major universities, to claim
its share of the benefits of VC invest-
ment.
VARIABLES SIGNIFICANT IN
EXPLAINING VC EFFORT 
ACROSS STATES